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Abstract
What is the effect of unionization on corporate financial policies? The average unionized
firm responds with lower cash and higher leverage to a unionization election than the average
firm escaping unionization. However, using a regression discontinuity design I find that the
causal effect of unionization is close to zero on average, but heterogeneous across firms. For the
subset of large and financially unconstrained firms, the causal effect is positive on leverage and
negative on cash; the opposite is true for small and financially constrained firms. These results
help reconcile controversially discussed views on how corporate finance and labor interact.
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1 Introduction
Two polar views shape the debate on the interaction between labor and corporate finance.
According to one view, firms strategically choose their financial policies to attain a better bargaining
position in future wage negotiations with their employees. In particular, according to this “bargaining
view,” firms respond with higher leverage and lower cash to unionization or the threat thereof
[Bronars and Deere, 1991, Matsa, 2010]; see also Baldwin [1983], Dasgupta and Sengupta [1993],
Perotti and Spier [1993], Sarig [1998]. The intuition is simple: unionized workers have a decreased
ability to extract rents when the firm has low cash reserves and already committed future cash flows
to debt holders. Therefore, reducing financial flexibility can reduce workers’ incentive to unionize.
The alternative view holds that an increase in fundamental or operating risk arising from more rigid
labor inputs leads to an increased need for financial flexibility [Mauer and Triantis, 1994, Gamba
and Triantis, 2008, Pratt, 2011, Kahl et al., 2013, Chen et al., 2013].1 Unionization is one reason
why an increase in labor rigidity can occur. Therefore, according to the “financial flexibility” view,
unionization should cause an accommodating response with more cash and less leverage.
While often discussed controversially, there is no contradiction between these forces. In theory,
both can be present at the same time in the same firm, whereas it is an empirical question which
one is quantitatively more important in the average firm, or in particular subsets of firms. Also, it is
conceivable that the “bargaining” motive is more important ex ante (before a unionization attempt),
whereas the “financial flexibility” motive is more important ex post (in case actual unionization
occurred).2 Lastly, it is important to understand if the response of firms becoming unionized is the
1This prediction is also consistent also with models emphasizing the effect of asset-market frictions on liquidity risk
management [Bolton et al., 2011]. Note that human capital is an asset without market liquidity from the perspective
of the firm. A similar prediction arises from firms’ internalization of expected costs of bankruptcy born by their
employees [Titman, 1984, Jaggia and Thakor, 1994, Berk et al., 2010]: implicit promises of wage insurance are only
credible when the firm has the financial reserves to honor them. Agrawal and Matsa [2012], Brown and Matsa [2012],
Kim [2012], Chemmanur et al. [2013] provide empirical support for variations of the insurance hypothesis, see also
Caggese and Cuñat [2008], Sraer and Thesmar [2007], Shivdasani and Stefanescu [2010], Ellul et al. [2013].
2The effect could also be non-monotonic: too much financial flexility can hurt a firm’s bargaining position, whereas
too little financial flexility can reduce shareholder value because of financial distress costs. The empirical question is
what the marginal effect of unionization is on the optimal level of financial flexibility.
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effect of unionization per se (i.e., the effect of changes in labor rigidity as well as how bargaining
is conducted as a result of unionization), or if the response is driven by potentially unobservable
variables that are correlated with more or less strong support for unionization, such as employee
morale. In other words, what is the causal effect of unionization on corporate financial policies?
As is evident from an active empirical literature on the effect of unionization (and labor rigidity
more generally) on corporate financial choices, there is much interest in these questions. Indeed,
approaching answers to them is of first-order importance for advancing our understanding of which
theories are most important in describing corporate financial decision making.
To answer these questions, this paper employs a data set that contains all unionization elections
in U.S. establishments belonging to Compustat firms between 1961 and 1999. The data set and
research design I use was first developed by DiNardo and Lee [2004], and extended by Lee and
Mas [2012] to study the causal effect of unionization on productivity and wages as well as on stock
returns, respectively. In contrast to earlier papers in the corporate finance literature that have used
variation in the ability to form unions at the state or industry levels, I directly examine firms
experiencing a unionization attempt. The research design also allows me to determine the causal
effect of unionization on firm policies.3
I find that the average firm experiencing a unionization election reduces its cash-to-asset ratio
and increases leverage. This observation is consistent with the bargaining view, but also with the
notion that firms in bad financial condition impose more unemployment risk on employees, and
employees facing higher unemployment risk have higher incentives to (attempt to) unionize in order
to enjoy better protection of their interests in bankruptcy. Next, firms in which more than 50%
of workers voted for unionization (which almost surely leads to unionization of the establishment)
respond with 2% lower cash-to-asset ratios and +0.8% higher leverage to an election, compared to
firms in which less than 50% voted for unionization (which almost never leads to unionization). This
3The data go back much further in time than other papers using the election design to investigate the unionization
effect on other outcome variables, such as innovation [Bradley et al., 2013] or staffing levels and quality [Sojourner
et al., 2012].
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result is consistent with the predictions of the bargaining view. Importantly, however, this analysis
ignores the information content of the precise share of the vote cast in favor of unionization, i.e.,
it gives equal weight to unionization events in which 100% of workers voted for unionization and
events in which only 50.1% voted for unionization.
Because the degree of union support, reflected in the vote share for unionization, may be cor-
related with unobserved characteristics of the firm or the workforce, estimating the causal effect
of unionization requires comparing observations in which only unionization but none of the other
characteristics changed significantly. The discontinuity in unionization outcomes at the 50% vote
share threshold affords such a comparison. I find that the financial policy response of close “winners”
(from the perspective of the union) and close “losers” is almost identical, both in terms of cash and
in terms of leverage. Thus, the causal effect of unionization per se is zero; the average effect is
entirely driven by the tails of the vote share distribution. From this result alone, one can either
conclude that the “bargaining” and “flexibility” effects exactly cancel out for the subset of firms at
the discontinuity, or that unionization per se is not a first-order driver of corporate financial policy.
To try and tell apart these interpretations, I analyze the average and causal effects of unionization
in subsamples of the data. If there is truly no causal effect of unionization, that should be true in
subsamples of the data as well. By contrast, if both mechanisms are equally important for the average
marginal firm, perhaps one is more important than the other in subsets of firms. To investigate this
possibility, I split the sample by the degree to which the firms can freely adjust their financial
policy at the time of the unionization election, as measured by ranking below (unconstrained) or
above (constrained) the median of the Whited and Wu [2006] index of financial constraints. A
firm presently unconstrained can become constrained in the future, and therefore has a motive for
risk management; according to the flexibility view, it should increase cash and decrease leverage in
response to an increase of labor rigidity. By contrast, a firm presently constrained faces a tradeoff
between two exclusive uses of the existing levels of cash and debt capacity: using (and thus reducing)
it now for investment, or keeping it for the future [Rampini et al., 2014]. Thus, a presently constrained
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firm will, if anything, reduce its financial flexibility in response to an increase of labor rigidity, but
definitely not increase it (because it can’t). By contrast to these predictions, the simplest version of
the bargaining view prescribes a tightening of financial flexibility for both types of firms.
Using the regression discontinuity design, I find that unionization causes a 6.2% increase of
cash-to-assets ratios among financially unconstrained firms. This effect, corresponding to a 0.43-
percentage-point increase from 6.86% to 7.29%, or $23 million for the average firm, is not only highly
statistically significant but also economically sizable: the increase corresponds to about 13% of the
average firm’s wage bill. I also find a highly statistically significant 2.4% reduction of on-balance-
sheet financial leverage, which corresponds to a 1-percentage-point decrease of leverage from 42.8%
to 41.8%, or a $63 million reduction in debt financing. By contrast, financially constrained firms
reduce cash and increase leverage, although these estimates are less precise. I view these results
as most easily compatible with the view that financial flexibility is a relatively more important
consideration for firms that can actively and freely adjust their financial policies. (Indeed, financial
flexibility is considered the most important driver of corporate financial decisions in general [Graham
and Harvey, 2001].) This interpretation is also corroborated by the finding that the average effect
of unionization reported above (a decrease of cash and increase in leverage) is entirely driven by the
subsample of financially constrained firms, which presumably cannot freely adjust their financial
policies.
An alternative interpretation is that bargaining considerations are relatively more important in
firms that are already financially constrained, whereas they are less important compared to finan-
cial flexibility in less financially constrained firms. Given the finding by Benmelech et al. [2012] of a
link between financial distress and wage concessions, this interpretation seems plausible; however,
a different explanation would need to address why bargaining considerations are unimportant in
financially unconstrained firms.4 Under either interpretation, the RD results indicate that union-
4Given that the measure of financial constraints I use is highly negatively correlated with firm size, the inter-
pretation could also be that the bargaining motive is more important for small firms and financial flexibility is a
more important concern for larger firms, e.g. because an increased cost in quasi-fixed [Oi, 1962] labor costs has the
potential to spill over to other plans. Also, there is an ongoing debate on how well measures of financial constraints
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ization per se is indeed an important determinant of corporate financial policies, but the effect is
heterogeneous across firms.
The fact that the average firm that becomes unionized responds with a more aggressive financial
policy supports the bargaining view, as advocated by earlier papers that use, among others, industry-
level unionization rates and state-level variation in the threat of unionization [e.g., Bronars and
Deere, 1991, Klasa et al., 2009, Matsa, 2010]. A marginal benefit of the present study is that I
observe actual unionization events at the firm level – and can thus confirm that most firms becoming
unionized indeed appear to follow the “bargaining” prescription.5 By contrast to the broader validity
of these “average” estimates, without further assumptions regression discontinuity estimates are only
valid “locally,” i.e., for a small subset of firms close to the discontinuity. The greater internal validity,
however, allows a causal interpretation of the RD results. As per the interpretation proposed above,
they support earlier findings showing that financial flexibility and labor rigidity or firing costs are
positively correlated at the state or country level [Kuzmina, 2012, Simintzi et al., 2015, Serfling,
2014]. These authors’ designs are valid for broader samples; the relative clean RD estimates are an
advantage of the present paper. A remarkable distinction from the literature in general is that I can
support both views within the same data set, depending only on the empirical model used and the
subsamples of the data investigated. Together with the cross-sectional finding that the same answer
does not apply to all firms even within the RD design, I hope to contribute to a more differentiated
and less controversial debate of the question on how labor and corporate finance interact.6
measure financial constraints [Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013].
5Matsa [2010]’s use of variation in the facility of unionization at the state level is an ideal proxy for the threat
of unionization and thus most literally tests Bronars and Deere [1991]’s proposed interaction between “the threat
of unionization, [and] the use of debt” (emphasize is mine). By contrast, I investigate the causal effect of actual
unionization at the firm level. However, firms that successfully deterred workers from even attempting to unionize
will never appear in my data set. Thus, our results speak to subtly different questions.
6Outside the corporate finance domain, Gourio [2007], Chen et al. [2012, 2011], Ochoa [2013] study the asset-
pricing consequences of unionization and other forms of labor rigidity, and find that labor risk is associated with a
higher risk of both equity and debt, leading to higher risk premia and cost of capital for such firms.
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2 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Endogeneity Concerns with OLS Estimates
The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of unionization on cash-to-assets ratios and
financial leverage. Cross-sectional regressions of the form
Yi = α+ β ·Di + γ ·Xi + εi, (1)
where Yi is firm i’s financial strategy (e.g., cash-to-assets ratio, or leverage), Di is a dummy that
captures union presence, Xi are known determinants of the financial strategy, and β is the coefficient
of interest, provide a good starting point. The coefficient β indicates the effect of a unionization
election on the average firm that becomes unionized (Di = 1) compared to the average firm that
experiences an election, but escapes unionization.
While such an estimate is interesting, it should not necessarily be interpreted as the causal effect
of unionization. One endogeneity concern is that some unobserved factors, Zi, may jointly affect the
net benefits of unionization and the optimal financial strategy of the firm. The existence of such a
factor would lead to biased estimates of β. For example, labor adjustment costs (search, training,
and firing costs) could be such a factor. Unionization is particularly attractive for employees who
are easy to replace, because workplace security is low absent union representation. At the same
time, bankruptcy costs and therefore the costs of debt are particularly low for such firms, resulting
in higher levels of leverage.
Another reason for endogeneity concerns is a reverse-causality argument. Employees of firms
with lower levels of cash may be more likely to seek unionization to achieve workplace protection,
because bankruptcy is more likely in these firms. Low levels of cash in unionized firms would then
not be the firm’s response to unionization, but unionization would be the employees’ response to
low levels of cash.7 As these considerations illustrate, β should not be interpreted as a causal effect
7The summary statistics of this paper indeed reveal that the average firm that experiences a unionization election
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of unionization on the firm’s financial strategy.
In an attempt to avoid or mitigate such concerns, this paper uses the regression-discontinuity
design and data set of unionization elections pioneered by DiNardo and Lee [2004] (DL) and extended
by Lee and Mas [2012] (LM); I follow their procedure in all respects, unless otherwise noted. The
institutional background giving rise to this research design is briefly described as follows.
2.2 Institutional Background
The National Labor Relations Act grants unionized workers the right to collectively bargain with
their employers about working conditions and wages. Yet both the benefits and costs of unionization
differ across workers. In particular, whereas causal effects of unionization on wages are close to zero
(DL), the benefits of unionization for workers can be large in terms of employment protection,
particularly for workers that are easy to replace absent unionization, for example, because they
carry little firm-specific human capital. By increasing firing costs, unionization artificially increases
the costs of replacing a worker, thus making labor turnover less attractive to the firm irrespective
of the level of firm-specific capital associated with the worker. Thus the employment-protection
benefit of unionization is particularly large for workers that would otherwise impose low labor
adjustment costs on the firm, while the benefit is small for workers that are already hard to replace
absent unionization. Unionization also comes at a differential opportunity cost to workers. For
example, individual differences in productivity are difficult to honor through differential wages when
a collective-bargaining agreement exists. Moreover, the potential benefits of unionization extend to
several dimensions, including working conditions, grievance procedures, and seniority rules [Freeman
and Medoff, 1984]. Different workers might lose different existing privileges relative to other workers
in these dimensions. Because the costs and benefits of unionization are not identical across workers,
the decision regarding whether to unionize is a non-trivial social-choice problem.
As a solution to this problem, the establishment of a new bargaining unit in U.S. establishments
(whether the election eventually succeeds or not) has declining cash levels and increasing leverage.
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typically requires a secret ballot election, in which workers vote for or against the establishment
of union representation [Farber, 1999]. Of course, the outcome of the election is not known with
precision before the fact, much less can the actors precisely control the outcome. In my data set,
a bargaining unit is created in an establishment if and only if a simple majority votes in favor of
unionization. That is, establishments with a union vote share larger than 50% get “treated” with
unionization, whereas no unionization treatment occurs if the vote share is below 50%. “Compliance”
with the treatment of a vote for unionization is 99.9%. (Lee and Mas [2012] provide more details.)
This discontinuity in the treatment of firms with unionization at the 50% vote-share threshold
suggests the use of a regression-discontinuity design. The idea is to compare the corporate-finance
response to unionization elections in firms in which the union barely wins with those in which the
union barely loses an election. The difference between these firms’ financial-policy responses can
be interpreted as the causal effect of unionization under some assumptions that I discuss and test
below.
2.3 Regression Discontinuity Design
Following precisely the procedure of Lee and Mas [2012], I estimate the causal effect of union-
ization as the size of the jump in financial policy at the 50% vote-share threshold of a sixth-order
polynomial of the union vote share. The regression specification is:
∆Yi = α+ β · wini +
6∑
j=1
γjm
j
i + εi, (2)
where ∆Yi is the firm’s financial-policy response to a unionization election in one of its estab-
lishments, and mi, defined as vote share minus 50%, is the winning margin attained in that election.
win is a dummy that takes unity, wini = 1, if the union wins the election, that is, when the vote
share is larger than 50% or, equivalently, when the winning margin is positive, mi > 0. β is the
estimated causal effect of unionization, the parameter of interest. In all specifications, I test against
8
the null hypothesis that unionization has no casual effect on cash and leverage.
The results are robust to alternative specifications of the regression model, as I discuss in detail
when presenting the results and robustness tests. Among them, I recognize that multiple elections
can happen in the same firm. In some cases, they even overlap; that is, the year before one election
can be the year of another election. Because the elections are likely to take place in different
establishments, I follow LM and regard such observations as independent, but cluster errors at
the firm level.8
2.4 Data Set Assembly
I combine annual CRSP/Compustat fundamentals from WRDS with the NLRB database of
unionization elections assembled by LM. It contains vote-share information for all unionization
elections that took place in the United States between 1961 and 1999.
An important manipulation of the data concerns the vote share. As DL explain, small elections
are less likely than large ones to provide a close outcome. To avoid bias, I follow DL’s procedure and
drop elections with less than 100 votes cast, adapt the vote share for elections with an even number
of votes cast to correct for a potentially remaining bias, and “bin” the remaining data in 20 equally
spaced vote-share bins for both the graphical and quantitative analysis. The results are similar
without this manipulation, or if I use a different number of bins. Like LM, because de-unionization
elections are rare and most unions simply cease to be active when their support fades, I drop union-
decertification events, retaining only certification elections.9 I discard nine observations that do not
satisfy basic accounting identities.
The characteristics of elections are as follows. Elections occur at a higher frequency in the earlier
8Excluding elections that are less than three years apart does not qualitatively change the results, possibly because
multiple elections in the same firm more frequently arise in very large firms, and elections in very large firms have a
relatively small influence on the main results: the elections take place at an establishment level, whereas the outcome
variables are measured at the firm level.
9For decertification events, the median fraction of the workplace voting is 2 percent, and approximately 30 percent
of elections in the sample involve less than 1 percent of the company’s workforce [Lee and Mas, 2012]. Any potential
results from these observations would therefore correspond to a very particularly selected sample, resulting in very
weak external validity.
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part of the sample; the average year of the election is 1976. Seventy-five percent of the elections
occur in manufacturing industries (SIC codes starting in 2 or 3), 7% occur in Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas&Sanitary Services (SIC codes starting in 4), and 7% in retail and
wholesale trade (SIC codes starting in 5). Other industries represent less than 3% of the elections.
The average number of votes cast in an election is 340; the maximum is 5,948. The average number
voting for unionization is 146; the maximum is 2,760. 29.7% of unionization elections are successful
(from the perspective of the union). I discuss the distribution of vote shares in more detail below.
2.5 Corporate Finance Variable Definitions
The dependent variable is the change of financial policy in response to unionization. I use
log differences ln(yafter) − ln(ybefore) to measure that change. ybefore is the average of the three
previous years’ values, and yafter is the average of the current and next years’ values. The variable
definitions yt are as follows: cash-to-assets ratio is cash and short-term investments (Compustat:
CHE) divided by total assets (AT); net leverage is total liabilities (LT) minus cash and short-term
investments, divided by total assets; operating leverage is defined as in Novy-Marx [2011] as the
cost of goods sold (COGS) plus selling, general, and administrative expenses (XSGA), divided by
total assets. Market leverage is total liabilities divided by the market value of equity.10 Auxiliary
results include as outcome variables profitability (EBITDA/sales), capital expenditures as a share
of sales (capx/sales), number of employees (emp), and cost of labor as a fraction of sales (total staff
expense xlr / sales).
A differential response may obtain for financially constrained and financially unconstrained
firms, for example for “dynamic risk management” Rampini et al. [2014] reasons, as laid out in the
introduction. It is conceivable that only financially unconstrained firms have the capacity to actively
10I focus my discussion on book leverage because I am interested in the firm’s choice of leverage rather than
changes in leverage driven by any market reaction to unionization elections. However, market-leverage results point
in the same direction. Also, I take total liabilities as the numerator of the leverage measures to avoid that changes
in accounting practices associated lead to a change in the level of leverage I measure. It turns out, however, that the
results are robust to alternative definitions.
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and freely adjust their capital structure and cash reserves, whereas financially constrained firms are
constrained in their choices, and may follow a more passive policy. I proxy for financial constraints
with the Whited-Wu measure of financial-constraints risk [Whited and Wu, 2006] (WW). That is,
for every firm that comes up for election in year t, I calculate the index ww at time t− 1 as 11
ww = −0.091 ∗ ib− 0.062 ∗ div + 0.021 ∗ ltlev − 0.0044 ∗ ln(at) + 0.102 ∗ isg − 0.035 ∗ sg, (3)
where ib is income before extraordinary items, div is a dividend-payer dummy, ltlev is long-
term debt (Compustat dltt) divided by total assets (at), ln(at) is the natural logarithm of total
assets, isg is average sales growth of firms in the same 3-digit SIC-code industry, and sg is the
firm’s sales growth (year-on-year log difference of sales).12 I show in the robustness-tests section
that qualitatively similar results obtain with four other standard measures of financial constraints.
For one of the robustness checks, I construct a ratings variable as an alternative measure of
financial constraints. I use S&P and Fitch long-term ratings, as well as S&P short-term credit
ratings. I construct a one-dimensional ratings variable from these three sources. In so doing, I can
use more ratings observations than I could by relying on long-term ratings alone. I assign "1" to
AAA, "2" to AAA-, and so forth for long-term ratings, and corresponding values for A-1+, A-1, ...
for short-term ratings. The mean of the three numbers constitutes my ratings variable.
2.6 Summary Statistics
After conditioning all variables on median plus/minus 5 times interquartile range, I obtain 4,631
observations. Similar results obtain when I winsorize or condition on being within the 98% of obser-
vations; without filters, the results are slightly less precise because of outliers. I present summary
11The index does not substantially change from before to after the election in firms of either subsample; also, there
is no significant time trend in which firms it sorts in which subsample. As a result, using the sample mean for each
year does not significantly change the results. Also, splitting the sample by the WW-index, which is constructed from
corporate finance variables, does not interfere with the research design, whose outcome variable is a corporate finance
variable. The sample split is with respect to the ex ante WW index.
12I don’t reestimate their model to avoid an endogeneity concern that arises because financial constraints risk is
potentially one of the factors why some firms get selected into my sample.
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statistics for the main variables in Table 1. To conserve space while providing a differentiated pic-
ture, I discuss the properties of the unconstrained and constrained subsamples, the combination
of which constitutes the full sample. The number of observations in the unconstrained (1804) and
constrained (1480) subsets is the number of elections for which I observe the full set of Compustat
variables I use in any of the specifications. The sample of constrained firms under this measure
is slightly smaller than the sample of unconstrained firms, because constrained firms tend to be
smaller by construction with the Whited-Wu index, and smaller firms have more missing observa-
tions. However, in most tests, I have more than 2,200 observations for both subsamples, and the
two samples are similarly large.
The average unconstrained firm has $6.1billion total assets, a market cap of $4.8 billion, and
net leverage of about 42%. The average firm in the constrained subsample has $598 million total
assets, a market cap of $321 million, and net leverage, similar to the unconstrained firms, of 43%.
Cash-to-assets ratios are 6.8% and 6.5% on average, respectively. Both in the unconstrained and
constrained subsamples, the average firm that experiences an election reduces cash by -4.1% and
-2.6%, respectively, comparing the average in the three-year period after the election with the three-
year period before the election, and increases net leverage by +2.6% or +2.4%.13 This observation
is consistent with the idea that firms under the threat of unionization strategically use reduced cash
and increased leverage to attain a better (potential) bargaining advantage with workers. However,
it is also consistent with the view that firms that expose their employees to more employment
risk are more likely to be targeted by unionization attempts, because unions protect employees in
bankruptcy. This is why an investigation of the response to actual unionization elections, conducted
below, is of interest. The full sample of firms ranks within the middle tercile of Compustat firms
in the year and quarter of the election in terms of size, profitability, and close to the median for
Tobin’s Q, profit margin, return on assets, and dividend ratio, whereas the average firm in the
13Also, compared to well-known average cash holdings of Compustat firms that have much increased in the last
three decades [Bates et al., 2009, Opler et al., 1999, Azar et al., 2015], the sample firms’ cash holdings are much
lower. Recall that most observations occur before the big run-up in cash holdings.
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“unconstrained” sample is larger and slightly more profitable by construction.
2.7 Validity Checks of the Regression Discontinuity Design
The key identifying assumption is that precisely predicting whether a union will closely win or
closely lose an election is impossible. (See Lee and Lemieux [2010] for a formal description of the
methodological procedure.) Otherwise, i.e. if the outcome were perfectly predictable, firms could
react to the election outcome before it occurs, and a change in the financial strategy comparing the
years after the election with the years before would not correspond to the firm’s reaction to a surprise
treatment with a shock to labor rigidity. However, the election outcome is not necessarily entirely
unpredictable – the firm can have a general sense of whether it likely will become unionized or not.
The design requires only that the precise outcome of the election cannot be predictable with perfect
precision in a close neighborhood of the discontinuity threshold. An examination of whether the
distribution of vote shares is continuous around the 50% threshold can validate this assumption.
Figure 1 shows that the vote-share distribution is indeed quasi-continuous for the whole sample
as well as for the unconstrained and constrained subsamples. It does not display an appreciable
discontinuity at the 50% vote-share threshold for either subsample. It looks similar for all other
sample splits I use later.14
Moreover, Table 2 shows that key observable characteristics of firms that end up getting barely
unionized do not differ significantly from those of firms that end up barely escaping unionization
ex ante, as measured in the year before the election. Thus firms in which the union barely wins
are not systematically different with respect to their observable characteristics than firms in which
the union barely loses the election, except for what concerns the assignment of unionization. In
other words, for the set of firms close to the 50% vote-share threshold, assignment of unionization is
indeed quasi-exogenous. As in a medical trial, I can therefore regard barely unionized firms as the
14McCrary [2008] tests are unsuitable to test the validity of the design used here not only because test is informative
only if any manipulation is monotonic and thus not necessarily informative, but also because of the manipulation of
the vote share as developed in DL and LM. I am grateful to John DiNardo for guidance on this question.
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“treated” part of the sample and the barely not-unionized firms as the control group.
The quasi-continuity of the vote-share distribution and the t-test results are important pieces
of evidence for the validity of the research design. However, of course, variables unobserved by the
researcher but observable to the firm might correctly predict close election outcomes. This inherently
untestable hypothesis is a remaining limitation of the research design. Other standard RD validity
checks are presented in the robustness- and placebo-test sections below.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Graphical Analysis
Figures 2 through 4 present the main results corresponding to the “causal effects” regression
specification (2). Figure 2 plots firms’ cash-to-asset responses to an election over the winning mar-
gin of the election. Each dot represents the average response of firms in a given vote-share bin.
Establishments in the right half of each graph become unionized; establishments in the left half
escape unionization. The establishments close to the vertical line at a zero winning margin belong
to the treatment firms (on the right) and the control firms (on the left). The solid lines represent the
fitted sixth-order polynomial through all observations; the dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals.
The difference in responses between the treatment firms just to the right and the control firms just
to the left of the winning threshold is the causal effect of unionization. The difference is represented
by a “jump” in the solid regression line; it is significant if the confidence bands don’t overlap. The
coefficients reported in Table 3 correspond to any such jump at a winning margin of 0%.
The fact that there is no perceptible jump in the polynomial fitted through the dots in Figure
2 indicates that unionization per se has no significant effect on firms’ choice of cash-to-asset ratios.
Similarly, Figure 3 indicates that there is no causal effect on book leverage, and Figure 4 shows
that the effect on market leverage is also not significantly different from zero. Panel C of Table 3
confirms these readings: the causal effect of unionization on cash-to-asset ratios and either book or
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market leverage is close to zero.
However, notice that the average firm to the right of the threshold (i.e., a firm becoming union-
ized) clearly responds with lower cash and higher leverage, compared to the average firm to the
left of the threshold. Thus, it appears that the average firm, and indeed most firms, respond to
unionization by a tightening of financial flexibility. Before I investigate average effects in detail,
however, I present a graphical analysis of the subsamples.
The upper left graph of figure 5 shows that unionization has a significant positive effect on
unconstrained firms’ cash-to-assets ratios. The upper right graph shows that that unionization has a
significant negative effect on financial leverage. The lower left graph shows that a traditional measure
of operating leverage does not capture the increase of labor rigidity imposed by unionization.15 The
lower right graph shows that unionization does not have a signifiant causal effect on market leverage
either.
Figure 6 repeats the analysis of Figure 5 for financially constrained firms. It shows a qualitatively
opposite pattern as Figure 6, although the results are less statistically significant. In particular, the
causal effect on cash-to-assets ratios is negative and seems marginally statistically significant. The
causal effect on financial leverage, operating leverage, and market leverage are all positive, also
marginally statistically significant, as I will verify below.
3.2 Quantitative Analysis of Causal Effects
Table 3 presents the numerical values of the estimated causal effect of unionization on cash-
to-assets ratios, net leverage, operating leverage, and market leverage. The upper panel displays
the estimate for firms that are likely able to freely choose their financial strategies (the “uncon-
strained” firms). Unionization causes 6.2% higher cash-to-assets ratios, compared to a hypothetical,
non-unionized, but otherwise identical firm. This effect, corresponding to a 0.43-percentage-point
15Whereas adjustment costs are not fixed costs and therefore don’t affect present-period operating leverage, they
do immediately increase the rigidity of operating leverage. The latter, of course, is difficult to measure, which is why
regarding unionization as an immediately observable proxy is informative also about the broader question how labor
rigidity affects corporate financial decisions.
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increase from 6.86% to 7.29%, or $23.3 million for the average firm, is highly statistically signifi-
cant. Concerning economic significance, it corresponds to about 13% of the average firm’s wage bill.
Given the amount of cash a firm needs to provide to survive a strike, this the estimate on cash-to-
assets seems a large but reasonable order of magnitude. Also, note that given that the estimates
represent the firm’s response to an election in one of its establishments, one should regard this
estimate as a lower bound. The 2.4% reduction of on-balance-sheet financial leverage corresponds
to a 1-percentage-point decrease of leverage from 42.8% to 41.8%, or a $63 million reduction in
debt financing for the average firm. The estimated coefficient on debt seems like an economically
significant magnitude as well. As indicated by the plots, unionization has essentially no effect on
operating leverage. Point estimates for market leverage point in the same direction as financial lever-
age, but the effect is not statistically significant. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, and
inconsistent with the null hypothesis that there is no effect of unionization on cash and leverage for
this subsample.
The second panel of Table 3 gives estimates for the constrained subsample. The estimates point
to a 4.9% reduction in cash-to-asset ratios and a 2.3% increase of leverage as a causal effect of
unionization. While the magnitudes are similarly large as for the unconstrained firms, none of the
estimates are strongly statistically significant; neither are the estimated increases of market leverage
and operating leverage. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. The third panel of Table 3
shows that the empirical design detects no causal effect of unionization on any variable in the pooled
sample, which is expected given opposite predictions and empirical results for the two subsamples.16
16I do not expect the causal effect of unionization to be reliably related to industry classifications, because the
unionization benefits to workers are inversely related to labor adjustment costs, that is, to the extent that replacing
employees is costly. As a result, observing unionization in human-capital-intensive industries is rare. For the same
reason, given a rare case of unionization in such an industry, its effect on the financial policy of affected firms should
be small. An example is unionization at Goldman Sachs [Tabuchi, 2012], which I presume had little effect on the
firm’s financial policy choices. Indeed, estimating differences across industries in the causal effect of unionization does
not reliably produce significant results. The insignificance can of course also be driven by a lack of power in these tests
as the sample becomes quite small – recall that 75% of the sample firms are in manufacturing, and the next-largest
industry accounts for only 7% of the elections.
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3.3 Quantitative Analysis of the Average Effect of Unionization
A comparison of the average response to all unsuccessful (from the perspective of the union)
elections on the left side of figures 5 and 6 with successful elections on the right side suggests the
average firm that gets unionized responds with lower cash-to-assets ratios and higher net leverage
to an election, compared to the average firm that does not get unionized. Formally, this comparison
corresponds to estimating β in the following regression:
Yi = α+ β · wini + εi. (4)
In this specification, the identifying information contained in the vote share is discarded. Table
4 shows the quantitative results. Driven by elections in which the union wins or loses by a wide
margin (as opposed to close elections), and entirely driven by the constrained subsample, the average
unionized firm’s cash-to-assets ratios decrease by 2% and leverage increases by 1%, compared to the
average non-unionized firm. These average effects go in the opposite direction of the causal effects
presented in the previous subsection. These results thus illustrate why a cross-sectional regression
will estimate a biased effect of unionization per se on corporate financial policy.
Whereas one main advantage of this paper is the ability to cleanly identifying the causal effect
of unionization, investigating the reasons why firms that do or don’t get unionized by a wide margin
change their financial policy in the opposite direction as the causal effect I estimate is very interesting
as well. As previously discussed, employees have an incentive to form a union when their individual
bargaining power is low. Employees have low bargaining power individually when the firm can
replace an employee with an outside worker at low cost; in other words, when labor adjustment
costs are low. This situation tends to arise when the worker has little firm-specific human capital.
Firms with low labor adjustment costs should therefore be expected to have (i) high union vote
shares and (ii) low cash and high leverage. However, such correlation does not correspond to a
causal effect of unionization on cash and leverage, but it rather reflects a selection effect, or the
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effect caused by an omitted variable, such as low firm-specific human capital.
3.4 Robustness Checks
This section provides several robustness checks. The two main dimensions are ensuring the
estimates of the causal effect of unionization are driven neither by the particular choice of regression
model nor by the particular index of financial constraints I use.
To ensure robustness with respect to the regression model, I run polynomial regressions of
different orders on different vote-share windows, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux [2008], see
also . To illustrate, I report in Table 5 results of a linear regression (as opposed to a sixth-order
polynomial regression) of the outcome variable on a union-win dummy and the vote share
Yi = α+ β · wini + γ ·mi + εi, (5)
in which the sample is restricted to a window of +/- 20% around the 0% winning margin. The
results, especially for unconstrained firms, are remarkably robust qualitatively and quantitatively,
compared to the results obtained with a polynomial regression reported in Table 3: cash-to-assets
ratios are estimated to increase by 6% as a causal effect of unionization, and net leverage is estimated
to decrease by 2% for unconstrained firms. The constrained firms’ response is -4.1% for cash to assets
and +1.6% for net leverage. However, as in the main results, the effects for financially constrained
firms are, if anything, marginally statistically significant.
Next, I investigate whether the particular index of financial-constraints risk I employ drives
the results. Table 6 provides evidence to the contrary. I run a linear regression on the same set of
‘close’ (+/-20%) elections as in the previous test, and construct a dummy for each type of financial
constraint. If an observation belongs to a firm above the median with regard to the respective
measure of financial constraints, the dummy takes the value 1. Apart from the Whited index (WI),
I use Kaplan and Zingales [1997]’s index of financial constraints (KZ), credit ratings (R), total assets
(AT), and a dividend payer (Div) dummy. I report the interaction of the financial-constraints dummy
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with the union-win dummy. The qualitative results are preserved, but also due to the smaller sample,
not all specifications yield significance. In sum, the qualitative results seem robust to the choice of
financial-constraint proxy. Because measures of financial constraints that less heavily correlate with
size produce similar results, I conclude that size is less likely to be the only driver of heterogeneity
in the causal effects but that indeed financial constraints seem to play a significant role.
The point estimates of these causal estimates do not decline when I limit the sample to elections
in firms for which only one establishment has a unionization election between 1961 and 1999. How-
ever, significance is not robust when I reduce the sample so substantially, because many observations
stem from large firms that have many establishments in which elections happen over the course of
several years.
An alternative interpretation of the results is that barely unionized establishments are not “re-
ally” unionized in the following sense. Union support in barely unionized forms may be weak enough
that the firm anticipates decertification shortly after the certification. The observed cash response
would then be a sign of relief by the firm that the union “almost lost” the election, rather than an
increase in precautionary cash holdings in response to increases in labor adjustment costs. Simi-
larly, a bias results if firms that barely do not get unionized are more likely than other firms to get
unionized in a potential future election. In that case, firms would take their expected unionization
status into account when making present-day cash decisions. The estimated coefficients should then
be regarded as a lower bound to the difference between a firm that is permanently unionized and
one that is permanently not unionized. However, as previously discussed (and as already established
by DL and LM), close elections do not predict future decertifications in my data set. In particular,
closely “lost” elections do not predict the frequency of future elections, thereby making this channel
an unlikely explanation for the results. To further alleviate this concern, I test whether excluding
observations for which an election follows another one within three years changes the results, and
find that it does not. As previously discussed, excluding all firms with multiple elections over the
sample period reduces statistical significance (as a result of sample selection) but does not reduce
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the point estimates. I conclude this hypothesis is also unlikely to drive the results.
Lastly, Roberts and Whited [2011] point out that the inclusion of linear controls in the regression
specification should not change the estimated effect, but if anything increase precision. Indeed, when
I include size and other known determinants of cash holdings or year-fixed effects as controls, the
coefficient remains almost perfectly unchanged.
3.5 Placebo Tests
This section provides further validity checks of the RD design. In particular, I first show that
variables that exhibit a discontinuity at the threshold in the above specifications do not also exhibit
significant discontinuities at other, meaningless vote-share thresholds that lack an institutional un-
derpinning and economic rationale [Kane, 2003]. In Figure 7, I run the polynomial regressions (2)
with cash-to-assets as the outcome variable, but instead of allowing for a jump at the economically
meaningful threshold of 50% vote share (or 0% winning margin), I allow for a discontinuity at 15%,
25%, 35%, ... , and 85% thresholds. Because there no economic reason exists for a discontinuity at
any of these thresholds, observing significant jumps at one or more of them could be an indication
of the instability of the research design. The graphs clearly show, however, that no significant dis-
continuities exist at any of the placebo thresholds. No significant discontinuities exist at placebo
thresholds for the other outcome variables I used either.
Second, I show the response of cash-to-assets ratios to placebo elections at date t − 1 and at
date t + 1, where t is the year of an actual election. Figure 8 presents firms’ cash and leverage
responses to such elections that did not actually take place. The change in cash-to-assets (upper
graphs) and net book leverage (lower graphs), respectively, is measured a year before the actual
election (left side) and a year after the actual election (right side), whereas the winning margin is
the winning margin of the actual election at time t. Under the identifying assumption that firms
cannot anticipate whether they will barely win or lose an election a year in advance, firms have no
economic reason to change their financial policies differentially before the election takes place. The
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left graphs for the t − 1 placebo election are consistent with that notion: the financial policies of
firms that will barely win or lose and election in the future are no different from each other. The
graphs to the right for the t+ 1 placebo election show in addition that firms that have barely won
or lost an election the year before do not change their financial policies differentially after a year
after the actual election either.
3.6 Additional Outcome Variables
I present estimates of the causal effect of unionization from regression specification (2) on several
outcome variables other than the previously discussed cash-to-assets ratios and financial, operating,
and market leverage. In particular, I first investigate whether the increase in cash-to-assets ratios is
primarily driven by increases in cash reserves or by a reduction in assets. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
7 show that the point estimate for increases in cash is larger than the point estimate for a reduction
in assets, though both explanations seem to play a role. Column 3 estimates the casual effect of
unionization on the ratio of EBITDA on sales. The insignificant coefficient with a point estimate
close to zero indicates the profitability channel is unlikely to be the driver of the results. Column
5 of the same table shows that reductions in investment, as a fraction of sales, likely contribute to
the increase of cash balances. (I normalize by sales rather than assets to enable a better comparison
across industries; manufacturing relies more on tangible assets than retail.) Although a reduction
of investment does not seem surprising as a causal effect of unionization, it is informative about the
flexibility versus bargaining view that marginally unionized firms on average do not pay out the
thus accumulated cash. Similarly, treated firms that are financially unconstrained seem to be able
to reduce cash outflows by scaling down their workforce. The fact that unionization causes neither
market value (column 4) nor compensation (column 7) in either subsample is consistent with the
results in LM and DL, respectively. However, it should be noted that LM and DL’s outcome variables
are more precisely measured.
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3.7 External Validity and Inherent Limitations
While regression discontinuity estimates are considered very “clean” estimates of causal effects,
external validity is a general challenge to the regression-discontinuity methodology. The present
paper is no exception. First, using unionization elections as an instrument implies that most estab-
lishments in my sample belong to manufacturing firms. At an econometric level, RD estimates are
always weighted average treatment effects, where the weights are the ex-ante probability that the
value of an individual’s assignment variable will be in the neighborhood of the threshold. In other
words, even within my sample, without further assumptions, the causal effect I estimate is only
valid for the observations close to the vote-share threshold. Firm characteristics might exist that
both explain why these observations are close to 50% and affect the true causal effect of unioniza-
tion, which therefore may be different further away from the threshold. Table 8 investigates this
possibility. It presents results of t-tests that test for differences in several pre-election observable
characteristics between the set of firms close to the threshold and further away from the threshold.
The only characteristic that is systematically related to whether a firm ends up closer to or further
from the threshold is small size. As explained in section 2, is a mechanical property of the research
design, which, following DL and LM, I mitigate as much as possible by excluding small elections.
The fact that observable characteristics other than this mechanical one do not seem to be system-
atically related to whether an election is close suggests that the results could also be valid outside
a narrow window around the 50% vote-share threshold. That said, the cost of a clean identification
with the RD design is that a concern necessarily remains that the causal effect of unionization is
different for firms with elections that do not fall in close proximity to the threshold.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on how the nature of a firm’s labor relations affects liquidity
risk management and capital structure. Specifically, I investigate firms’ financial choices in response
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to unionization elections. I find that the average firm that becomes unionized decreases cash and
increases leverage, compared to the average firm that does not become unionized. This finding
resonates with the view that firms secure a more advantageous bargaining position by reducing
flexibility following a unionization event. I also find, however, that the causal effect of unionization,
as measured with a regression discontinuity design, is close to zero for both cash and leverage. That
means that unionization per se is not the driver of the average response found earlier, but that
unobserved variables correlated with high union support (or the degree of union support itself)
causes the response of the average firm. Interestingly, however, I find that unionization per se does
significantly affect corporate financial policy in subsets of the data. Firms that look financially un-
constrained according to standard measures appear to manage the increased fundamental riskiness
arising from more rigid labor inputs with higher cash and lower leverage, i.e., they increase their
financial flexibility. By contrast, financially constrained firms respond with lower cash and higher
leverage. Under the interpretation that financially unconstrained firms can freely adjust their finan-
cial ratios, whereas financially constrained firms cannot, but instead follow a more passive policy,
this subsample split strongly supports the view that financial flexibility is a more important de-
terminant of corporate financial decision making for the marginal firm. I conclude that both the
“bargaining” and the “financial flexibility” view are important frameworks that help understand the
interaction between labor and corporate finance. Which one is relatively stronger depends on the
subset of firms under investigation.
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Figure 1: Vote-share distributions for the full sample (top), unconstrained firms (center), and con-
strained firms (bottom). The 20 vote-share bins are equally spaced and constructed as in Lee and Mas
[2012]. The unconstrained/constrained split is at the sample median of the Whited-Wu financial-
constraints index. An identifying assumption of the RD design is that no party can precisely control
the election outcome just to the right and left of the 50% vote-share threshold. In other words,
there must not be systematic sorting of firms, or subsets of firms within close proximity to that
threshold. Such sorting would be visible from a discontinuity in the vote-share distribution at the
50% vote-share threshold. (Only quasi-continuity of the forcing variable’s distribution is required,
but not equal probabilities just right and left of the threshold.)
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Figure 2: Unionization election response of cash-to-asset ratios (“cash”= cash divided by total assets).
The dots depict the average cash-to-asset ratio within the vote share bins introduced in Figure 1.
Winning margin is vote share minus 50%. The right hemispheres of the graphs show the response of
firms in which a union gets established. The left hemisphere has the response of firms in which no
union gets established. The solid line represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial
regression; the dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. Any discontinuity of the outcome variable at the 0%-winning margin threshold is the estimated
causal effect of unionization.
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Figure 3: Unionization election response of net book leverage ratios. The dots depict the average
cash-to-asset ratio within the vote share bins introduced in Figure 1.Winning margin is vote share
minus 50%. The right hemispheres of the graphs show the response of firms in which a union gets
established. The left hemisphere has the response of firms in which no union gets established. The
solid line represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial regression; the dotted lines
are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. A discontinuity of the
outcome variable at the 0%-winning margin threshold is the estimated causal effect of unionization.
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Figure 4: Unionization election response of market leverage ratios. The dots depict the average
value of the outcome variable within the vote share bins introduced in Figure 1. Winning margin
is vote share minus 50%. The right hemispheres of the graphs show the response of firms in which
a union gets established. The left hemisphere has the response of firms in which no union gets
established. The solid line represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial regression;
the dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. A
discontinuity of the outcome variable at the 0%-winning margin threshold is the estimated causal
effect of unionization.
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Figure 5: Election response of financially unconstrained firms’ cash-to-asset ratios (“cash”= cash
divided by total assets), net book leverage (“booklev” = debt minus cash divided by total assets),
operating leverage (“operatinglev”, defined as in Novy-Marx [2011]), and market leverage (“mar-
ketlev” = total liabilities / (market value of equity + total liabilities)). “Unconstrained” means
being below the sample median according to the Whited-Wu index. The dots depict the average
value of the outcome variable within the vote share bins introduced in Figure 1. Winning margin
is vote share minus 50%. The right hemispheres of the graphs show the response of firms in which
a union gets established. The left hemisphere has the response of firms in which no union gets
established. The solid line represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial regression;
the dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. A
discontinuity of the outcome variable at the 0%-winning margin threshold is the estimated causal
effect of unionization.
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Figure 6: Election response of financially constrained firms’ cash-to-assets ratios (“cash”= cash di-
vided by total assets), net book leverage (“booklev” = debt minus cash divided by total assets),
operating leverage (“operatinglev,” defined as in Novy-Marx [2011]), and market leverage (“mar-
ketlev” = total liabilities / (market value of equity + total liabilities)). “Constrained” means being
above the sample median according to the Whited-Wu index. The dots depict the average value
of the outcome variable within the vote-share bins introduced in Figure 1. Winning margin is vote
share minus 50%. The right hemispheres of the graphs show the response of firms in which a union
is established. The left hemisphere has the response of firms in which no union is established. The
solid line represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial regression; the dotted lines
are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. A discontinuity of the
outcome variable at the 0%-winning-margin threshold is the estimated causal effect of unionization.
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Figure 7: Changes of financially unconstrained firms’ cash-to-assets ratios (“cash”= cash divided by
total assets) with meaningless “placebo” winning thresholds of 15%, 25%, 35%, 45%, 55%, 65%,
75%, 85% (left to right, top to bottom). “Unconstrained” means being below the sample median
according to the Whited-Wu index. The dots depict the average value of cash-to-assets ratios of
firms falling in the vote-share bins introduced in Figure 1. Winning margin is defined as vote share
minus 50%. A union is established if and only if the winning margin is positive. The solid line
represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial regression; the dotted lines are 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The regression specification
allows the line to jump at the above-described thresholds, instead of at the true winning threshold
of 50% for which the results are presented in Figure 5. No economic reason exists for firms left or
right of the placebo thresholds to respond differently to an election. Therefore, observing no jumps
in any of the above graphs supports the validity of the research design.
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Figure 8: Response of financially unconstrained firms’ cash-to-assets ratios (“cash”= cash divided
by total assets) and net book leverage (“booklev” = debt minus cash divided by total assets) to
“placebo” elections a year before or after the actual election. “Unconstrained” means being below
the sample median according to the Whited-Wu index. The dots depict the average value of cash-to-
assets ratios and net leverage of firms falling in the vote-share bins introduced in Figure 1. Winning
margin is defined as vote share minus 50%. A union is established if and only if the winning margin
is positive. The solid line represents predicted values based on a sixth-order polynomial regression;
the dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The
regression specification allows for a discontinuity at a winning margin of 0. The outcome variable
is measured not at the actual election date, but a year before and a year later, respectively. No
economic reason exists for firms left or right of the 50% vote-share threshold to respond differently
to a placebo election, that is, an election that did not take place. Therefore, observing no jumps in
the above graphs supports the validity of the research design.
Table 1: Summary statistics for key variables for the full sample, 1961-1999, in thousands. “Un-
constrained” (“constrained”) means being in the lower (upper) half of the sample according to the
Whited-Wu index of financial constraints. The abbreviations mean cash-to-asset ratio (c2a), net
leverage (net lev), operating leverage (ol), and market leverage (mlev). The number of observations
indicates the number of election observations with a complete set of Compustat variables.
All firms (N=3286) mean p50 sd min max
Total Assets 3649.912 833.397 10535.34 3.353 217123.4
Cash 223.9463 36.0025 673.3574 0 11044.3
Total Liabilities 2141.197 380.9935 7617.233 1.06 193777.9
Net Liabilities 1917.251 325.4515 7235.778 -206.184 182733.6
Book Equity 1479.486 418.551 3457.317 2.293 43542
Market Cap 2809.706 578.7755 7537.473 .51525 130562.3
Employees 62.06484 24 118.1942 .069 853
Cash-to-Assets .0670297 .0462282 .0626051 0 .5488421
Net Leverage .4205393 .433251 .1591972 -.2113108 .9144532
Operating Leverage 2.777399 2.418946 1.541548 .2783285 10.4073
Market Leverage 1.12717 .7285635 1.413714 .0240333 25.02227
∆c2a -.0346486 -.0346303 .2209359 -1.024753 1.044239
∆net lev .0257099 .0243249 .0869404 -.4146557 .4324271
∆ol .0405121 .0334791 .1912406 -.949031 1.026049
∆mlev .3321717 .1426453 .7692133 -.9513371 3.960541
Unconstrained (N=1804) mean p50 sd min max
Total Assets 6157.154 2073.047 13523.7 229.478 217123.4
Cash 376.2023 102.457 849.0552 0 11044.3
Total Liabilities 3606.023 1032.79 9935.108 46.643 193777.9
Net Liabilities 3229.821 877.107 9478.652 -206.184 182733.6
Book Equity 2499.784 1003.646 4319.37 167.132 43542
Market Cap 4853.042 1649.971 9597.73 104.247 130562.3
Employees 101.5764 48 143.4538 .75 853
Cash-to-Assets .0686449 .0497468 .0615058 0 .4696362
Net Leverage .4275859 .4382541 .1491718 -.175484 .8450245
Operating Leverage 2.561028 2.280039 1.352355 .302783 10.28264
Market Leverage .8742799 .6598065 .8564128 .0240333 12.48054
∆c2a -.0416534 -.0403861 .2170207 -.9403229 1.044239
∆net lev .0266018 .0246825 .0807946 -.3134976 .4010054
∆ol .0271484 .0307361 .1667665 -.8634019 .9647384
∆mlev .2451178 .1155684 .635545 -.8831711 3.783424
Constrained (N=1480) mean p50 sd min max
Total Assets 597.9977 164.546 2563.175 3.353 38024
Cash 38.60879 7.2665 256.0329 0 5149
Total Liabilities 358.4299 70.9075 1655.312 1.06 25071
Net Liabilities 319.8211 60.393 1449.949 -23.715 19922
Book Equity 237.2594 85.782 994.6373 2.293 17814.6
Market Cap 321.9309 94.32464 1612.464 .51525 47639.19
Employees 13.96464 6.18 41.46172 .069 746
Cash-to-Assets .0650536 .0429945 .0639261 0 .5488421
Net Leverage .412323 .4272111 .1700965 -.2113108 .9144532
Operating Leverage 3.043607 2.597468 1.707662 .2783285 10.4073
Market Leverage 1.436713 .8756214 1.835705 .0405119 25.02227
∆c2a -.0258859 -.0270909 .2254506 -0.944753 .9374832
∆net lev .0244402 .0235058 .0938262 -.4146557 .4324271
∆ol .0562991 .035959 .2160428 -.949031 1.026049
∆mlev .4378143 .1950019 .8951082 -.9513371 3.960541
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Table 3: Causal effect of unionization on changes of cash-to-assets ratio (c2a), net leverage (net lev),
operating leverage (ol), and market leverage (mlev). The tables report coefficients on the union-win
dummy from regressions of financial outcome variables on a sixth-order polynomial of the winning
margin and on a win dummy, as well as corresponding p-values. “Unconstrained” means being in the
lower half of the sample according to the Whited-Wu index of financial constraints; the definition
of “constrained” is symmetric. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Panel A: Unconstrained firms ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win 0.0603*** -0.0237*** 0.00985 -0.0574
(0.0222) (0.00843) (0.0204) (0.0797)
Observations 2,243 2,243 1,967 2,138
Panel B: Constrained firms ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win -0.0498* 0.0232** 0.0515* 0.222**
(0.0270) (0.0112) (0.0266) (0.111)
Observations 2,238 2,169 1,872 1,899
Panel C: Full sample ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win 0.00320 0.000168 0.0261 0.0663
(0.0178) (0.00719) (0.0167) (0.0660)
Observations 4,489 4,416 3,845 4,040
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Non-causal correlations between unionization and changes of cash-to-assets ratio (c2a),
net leverage (net lev), operating leverage (ol), and market leverage (mlev). OLS regression of the
outcome variable on a union-win dummy, with the slope constrained to zero. The definition of
“(un-)constrained” is according to Whited-Wu, as before. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
Panel A: Unconstrained firms ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win -0.0121 0.00528 -0.0125 0.0322
(0.0118) (0.00416) (0.0119) (0.0308)
Observations 2,243 2,243 1,967 2,138
Panel B: Constrained firms ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win -0.0290*** 0.0106** 0.0180 0.0436
(0.0107) (0.00481) (0.0127) (0.0445)
Observations 2,238 2,169 1,872 1,899
Panel C: Full sample ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win -0.0210*** 0.00825** 0.00406 0.0437
(0.00770) (0.00324) (0.00872) (0.0266)
Observations 4,489 4,416 3,845 4,040
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Causal effect of unionization on corporate finance variables from linear regressions on the
winning margin and win dummy, with data within 20% of the winning threshold. All definitions are
as in Table 3. The table shows that the results from Table 3 are robust to the choice of regression
model.
Panel A: Unconstrained firms ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win 0.0584*** -0.0201*** 0.00899 -0.0372
(0.0200) (0.00759) (0.0188) (0.0724)
Observations 1,594 1,594 1,391 1,515
Panel B: Constrained firms ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win -0.0418* 0.0160 0.0441* 0.182*
(0.0242) (0.0105) (0.0249) (0.0975)
Observations 1,611 1,559 1,342 1,353
Panel C: Full sample ∆(c2a) ∆(net lev) ∆(ol) ∆(mlev)
Union-win 0.00686 -0.00144 0.0251 0.0658
(0.0161) (0.00657) (0.0156) (0.0593)
Observations 3,210 3,155 2,737 2,869
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Causal effect of unionization on changes of cash (che), total assets (at), profitability (profit
= EBITDA/sales), market value (mval), capital expenditures (capx = capex/sales), number of
employees (emp), and cost of labor (comp = total staff expense / sales). The tables report coefficients
on the union-win dummy from sixth-order polynomial regressions on the winning margin and win
dummy, as well as corresponding p-values. “Unconstrained” means being in the lower half of the
sample according to the Whited-Wu index of financial constraints; the definition of “constrained” is
symmetric. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Panel A: Unconstrained firms ∆(che) ∆(at) ∆(profit) ∆(mval) ∆(capx) ∆(emp) ∆(comp)
Union-win 0.0754 -0.0317 -0.000677 -0.0242 -0.0295** -0.0454** 0.0120
(0.0665) (0.0229) (0.00192) (0.0451) (0.0137) (0.0210) (0.00834)
Observations 2,241 2,247 2,237 2,146 2,228 2,248 1,129
Panel B: Constrained firms ∆(che) ∆(at) ∆(profit) ∆(mval) ∆(capx) ∆(emp) ∆(comp)
Union-win -0.123 0.0208 0.000508 -0.0629 0.0213 0.0113 0.0107
(0.0759) (0.0261) (0.00224) (0.0724) (0.0170) (0.0265) (0.0115)
Observations 2,243 2,253 1,979 2,182 2,182 2,176 561
Panel C: Full sample ∆(che) ∆(at) ∆(profit) ∆(mval) ∆(capx) ∆(emp) ∆(comp)
Union-win -0.0281 -0.00508 -4.91e-05 -0.0363 -0.00329 -0.0193 0.0114*
(0.0178) (0.00719) (0.0167) (0.0660) (0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00640)
Observations 4,492 4,512 4,470 4,139 4,417 4,434 1,694
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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